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TENURE, THE ABERRANT CONSUMER CONTRACT
JAMES J. WHITE*
This symposium concerns asymmetric contracts, usually contracts 
where one party has great power and the other has little. The papers deal 
generally with contracts between consumers who get a “take it or leave it” 
offer and corporations such as Hertz, Microsoft, Verizon, and General Mo-
tors who draft the contracts according to their wishes. In almost all of these 
asymmetric contracts the stronger (corporations) writes the terms and pre-
sents them to the weaker (consumers) for signing without negotiation. In-
deed the corporate agent with whom the consumer deals (e.g., the person at 
the Hertz desk) has no authority to change the contract or to bind its princi-
pal to any modification of the contract. The deal is simple: take it or leave 
it.
My paper explores the tenure contract, which is commonly executed 
between a strong employer and a weak employee. But here the rule is re-
versed; the employee, presumptively the weaker party, gets his terms. I 
address three issues: 1) How did this contract come about? 2) What are the 
terms of the “tenure” contract? 3) Is it a good thing?
I. WHERE DID TENURE COME FROM?
Tenure or something like it has long been the rule in many European 
universities. In Germany, the universities have never had governing boards 
of outsiders of the kind that are the norm in the United States.1 So, apart 
from an occasional intrusion by the state, German academics were free to 
do as they pleased without much oversight or outside intrusion.2 In the 18th
and 19th centuries, many American academics looked to the German uni-
versities as models of academic thought and behavior.3 However, there is 
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I thank Aisulu Masylka-
nova (‘12), Dorothy J. Heebner (‘15) and Joseph J. Halso (‘15) for their research assistance.
1. Universities in the Middle Ages were considered autonomous corporations even by popes and 
emperors. Their members made all internal decisions about personnel and teaching. ROBERT 
HOFSTADER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 5-7 (1955).
2. Id.
3. In the nineteenth century, more than nine thousand American students attended universities in 
Germany and many German expatriates taught in American universities. German academic influence 
reinforced American trends in education as American universities became more “secular, specialized, 
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no direct connection between our tenure and the German system. Indeed in 
the early days at Harvard and other early schools, young men with no as-
surance of long-term employment did the bulk of the teaching.4
The 18th and 19th centuries also brought periodic eruptions of conflict 
between American academics and their religious sponsors. Protestant 
churches established many of the early schools in New England and others 
had Roman Catholic sponsors. Many of the university teachers were drawn 
from the clergy.5 As lay academics replaced the clergy, there was inevita-
ble conflict between church dogma and new learning. For example, Dar-
win’s version of the growth and development of the species was at war 
with the Christian belief that all were descendants of Adam and Eve and 
that the development of man occurred under and was directed by the un-
seen hand of God.6
The direct and most immediate stimulant to the birth and growth of 
tenure comes not from the old schools in New England, but from fresh 
faces on the West Coast, the Middle West and the South.7 Between 1890 
and intellectually ambitious.” Id. at 367-68. See also Walter P. Metzger, The German Contribution to 
the American Theory of Academic Freedom, in THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN 
FORMATION: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND REPORTS 214, 215 (Walter P. Metzger ed., 1977).
4. For more than one hundred years, all teaching at Harvard was done by one or more tutors –
men in their twenties who stayed for an average length of two and a half years. Not until the 18th 
century did Harvard start calling teachers “professors” and pay them enough to induce them to stay for 
longer tenures. HOFSTADER & METZGER, supra note 1, at 85. See also Henry Dunster, Dunster’s Memo-
randum of December, 1653, in THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE app. E, at 448-51 (Samuel E. 
Morrison ed., 1935). 
5. During the eighteenth century and earlier, students were considered highly impressionable and 
their religious development an important part of their university education, so instructors were required 
to have certain moral qualities. Most universities practiced “restraint by recruitment”: any incoming 
president, professor, or tutor was screened to make sure he accepted the requisite theological doctrines. 
HOFSTADER & METZGER, supra note 1, at 155. See also JOSIAH QUINCY, THE HISTORY OF HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY 253-60 (1840).
6. During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, secularization was the most significant trend in 
universities. Academic freedom of religion was limited to students at first, while instructors were still 
required to reflect the morality of the trustees that chose them. HOFSTADER & METZGER, supra note 1,
at 190. By the second half of the eighteenth century, strictly secular science curriculum was becoming 
more and more of a part of the university system. In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, 
universities went through “great retrogression” when colleges were founded by or aligned with particu-
lar Christian denominations. “Sectarian narrowness” limited the universities’ development and cramped 
secular education. Not until after the Civil War did universities start liberalizing under public pressure 
and international influence. Id. at 250-74.
7. Four professors, Richard T. Ely at Wisconsin, Edward W. Bemis at Chicago, Edward A. Ross 
at Stanford, and John S. Bassett at Trinity, ran into trouble at their respective universities for voicing 
unconventional opinions. Hofstader asserts the differences in their experiences suggests more than 
income class caused the disputes. “At Wisconsin [where Ely taught], the attack on academic freedom 
was undertaken by a bungling, small town teacher . . . [a]t Chicago [where Bemis taught], the attack 
was probably inspired by certain local big businessmen. . . . Both Ross and Bassett were members of 
institutions that were dependent on a single rich sponsor. Both were sharply attacked for speaking 
unpopular opinion. Ross was eventually dismissed, the victim of his patron’s intolerance; Bassett was 
retained, the beneficiary of his patron’s indulgence.” Id. at 436. 
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and 1915, well-established professors were dismissed or subject to attempt-
ed dismissals at Stanford, Wisconsin, Chicago, and Duke.8 To a considera-
ble degree these dismissals or attempts arose from the displeasure of 
governing boards (or, in the case of Stanford, the governing person) that 
were offended by the positions taken by the professors. Professor Ross, at 
Stanford, advocated restricting the importation of Chinese labor and called 
for public ownership of utilities.9At Wisconsin, Professor Ely applauded 
“strikes and boycotts.” While Professor Bemis at Chicago, justified the 
Pullman strikers’ actions by noting the railroads’ own “open violation of 
inter-state commerce law.”10 Professor Bassett, at Duke (then Trinity Col-
lege), was challenged for his defense of black people in the face of lynch-
ings and other hostile anti-black behavior, when he urged that it was time 
to integrate “these children of Africa into our American life.”11
Two of the four professors, Ely at Wisconsin and Bassett at Duke, 
were saved by the help of wise trustees or by the support of strong presi-
dents.12 Bemis at Chicago went quickly and quietly but Ross at Stanford 
was another matter. Ross faced the challenge of Mrs. Stanford, the widow 
of the school’s founder and the sole trustee.13 President Jordan was no 
match for her determined attack.
In the words of Hofstadter, “Edward A. Ross was exactly the man to 
ignite the situation. Fresh from Ely’s seminar, fired by liberal causes, con-
vinced that the aim of big business was to throttle social criticism, Ross had 
come to Stanford almost spoiling for a fight.”14 Ross spoke publicly in 
defense of the socialist leader, Eugene Debs, and made sure that his views 
were published in academic journals, as well as in the public press.15 Ross’ 
dismissal received treatment not only in the San Francisco papers, but also 
in the New York press.16 As a result of his dismissal, seven members of the 
Stanford faculty resigned.17
The American Economic Association agreed in 1900 to investigate the 
Ross case and appointed a committee of inquiry. It appears that the com-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 438 (“[I]n a university that had been founded by a railroad republican whose ventures 
had depended on free labor, he advocated municipal ownership of utilities and a ban on Oriental immi-
gration.”).
10. Id. at 426-27.
11. Id. at 446.
12. Id. at 430-31, 436.
13. Id. at 438-40.
14. Id. at 438.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 440.
17. Id. at 442.
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mittee was not particularly successful or competent in digging out the mo-
tives or developing the facts behind Ross’s dismissal.18 Nevertheless this 
committee of inquiry became the framework for the standing committee A 
of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP).19 The 
AAUP was founded in 1915, and that same year issued a “Declaration of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.”20 Among the 
“practical proposals” of the committee were the assertion that “[o]fficial 
action relating to re-appointment and refusals of reappointment should be 
taken only with the advice and consent of some board or committee repre-
sentative of the faculty.”21 The principles urged institutions to make clear 
the term of each appointment, and it provided that those who had served 
more than 10 years be granted tenure.22 The principles also advised institu-
tions to formulate grounds for dismissal and to establish “judicial hearings” 
before dismissal.23 The hearing for dismissal to be held before a “commit-
tee chosen by the faculty senate or council or by the faculty at large.”24
It appears that the formation of the AAUP in 1915 was a direct reac-
tion to the four notorious cases described above between 1890 and 1903 
and, to a lesser extent, from several other dismissal cases between 1903 and 
1915.25
Before the end of the 20th century, the AAUP had become a full-
fledged union on more than 70 campuses where it is the collective bargain-
ing agent for the faculty.26 But in 1915 the organization was little more 
18. The committee made two big mistakes: they met as an informal body and their investigation 
had too narrow a scope, making the public wary of their findings, and they tried to find out what moti-
vated Mrs. Stanford to dismiss Ross, rather than bigger questions like whether one person should have 
the power to run a university entirely, whether professors should be on year-to-year contracts, etc. Id. at
443-44.
19. Id. at 442-43.
20. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, APPENDIX I: 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE 291 (1915) [hereinafter GENERAL DECLARATION],
available at http://www.aaup.org/re port/1915-declaration-principles-academic-freedom-and-academic-
tenure.pdf
21. Id. at 300.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 301.
25. Metzger puts forward two reasons why this might have happened: (1) the complexity of the 
cases and the increasing sophistication of university administrators created the idea in the academic 
community that only a professor’s peers could accurately evaluate his performance, and only disinter-
ested outsiders could devise the standards they should use and the procedures to follow, or (2) powerful 
individuals acted on the spur of the moment, reacting to the unfairness they perceived in the Ross case 
and other cases, and created a lasting institution anyway. HOFSTADER & METZGER, supra note 1, at 443.
26. In the late 1960s local AAUP chapters began to pursue collective bargaining; they included 
Belleville Area college in Illinois (1967), Saint John’s University in New York (1970), and Oakland 
University in Michigan (1971). See generally ERNST BENJAMIN, FACULTY BARGAINING, in ACADEMIC 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (Ernst Benjamin & Michael Mauer, eds., 2006). In 1973, the AAUP issued 
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than a self-appointed and highly interested group of individual faculty 
members. How did the practice of granting tenure spread so far and what 
hand did the AAUP have in that spread?
Certainly the activist founders of the AAUP devoted their energies to 
more than just the AAUP. Each member also must have been actively pro-
moting tenure at his home school.27 Certainly the times were right; univer-
sity administrations may have viewed the grant of tenure as better than the 
alternative: a socialist union among the faculty of the kind that Eugene 
Debs might inspire. Even conservative professors who would refuse to 
become union members would gladly accept a position that could be termi-
nated only for cause.
The spread of tenure may also have been helped by the identity of the 
University presidents. Unlike the executives of industrial companies and 
unlike boards of trustees of both industrial and educational institutions, the 
presidents of universities are commonly drawn from the professoriate. The 
hierarchy of an industrial company, where those who rise from the factory 
floor to chief executive officer are the rare exception, is the reverse of an 
academic institution’s hierarchy, where the norm is for a professor to rise to 
be president. A CEO or owner of an industrial company may regard the 
rank and file of a company union as his enemy, but the President of a uni-
versity will regard his rank and file, the professors, at worst as frenemies, 
and, in good times, as his friends.
The spread of tenure from the schools represented on the AAUP 
committee that issued the 1915 Principles must also have been helped by 
the high status of those schools. “If Harvard is doing this, shouldn’t we do 
it too?”28
its “Statement on Collective Bargaining,” which recognized formal bargaining as a major additional 
way of realizing the Association’s goals in higher education. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1973 
STATEMENT ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 259 (1973), http://www.aaup.org/file/statement-on-
collective-bargaining.pdf. The AAUP formed its Collective Bargaining Congress (CBC) in 1976, which 
serves as an umbrella organization of local AAUP collective bargaining chapters and affiliates. Its 
purpose is to develop and disseminate information and resources in support of collective bargaining 
activities of local AAUP chapters, and to engage in other activities in support of higher education 
collective bargaining. The Congress meets annually in conjunction with the AAUP’s annual meeting in 
June, and holds regional conferences throughout the year. Currently, the CBC comprises more than 70 
AAUP chapters and affiliates that serve as the collective bargaining representative on their campuses, 
including California State University, University of Connecticut, State University of New York, and 
New England state universities (Maine; Massachusetts; New Hampshire; Vermont; Rhode Island). See
History, AAUPCBC.ORG, http://www.aaupcbc.org/about/history (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
27. Ten years after the 1940 Statement of Principles, “many” universities and colleges had adopt-
ed it or written their own policies very similar to it. Robert P. Ludlum, Academic Freedom and Tenure: 
A History, 10 ANTIOCH REV. 3, 25 (1950).
28. Even before the AAUP published the 1915 Principles, the elite universities mostly did not 
treat their professors as at-will employees. By 1820 Harvard appointed some professors with “indefi-
nite” terms. By 1910, a survey of 22 major universities showed only faculty members with the rank of 
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But the most clever and simplest trick of the AAUP is one that might 
have been practiced by your mother, namely shaming. Shortly after its 
establishment, the AAUP formed an organization described as “Committee 
A.”29 Committee A’s responsibility was to investigate complaints from 
professors who had suffered dismissal or demotion.30 The AAUP publishes 
the reports of the committee.31 These reports cannot undo a dismissal, and 
they have no legally binding effect on an institution, but they shame the 
institution.32 No school wishes to be singled out in a public document as 
having dismissed a professor without proper cause. Such claims, even 
though issued by an organization that one does not recognize, can also have 
an impact on that school’s recruiting of new faculty members. It may have 
a direct impact on the members of the department identified in the report 
and on the members of the institution’s administrative hierarchy.33
So it came to pass that most teachers at American colleges and univer-
sities went from at-will employment in the 19th century to tenured employ-
ment by the middle of the 20th century.34 As we see, the movement was 
lead not by fire-breathing unionists, like the Reuther brothers, but by gen-
teel and conservative members of the professorate. The movement was 
helped along by foolish attempts at some schools to fire well-established 
professors for acts that, by today’s standards, seem more quaint than outra-
instructor were appraised annually, and those with the rank of professor held their positions with “pre-
sumptive permanence.” The committee hoped the 1915 Principles would actually raise the standards for 
faculty by creating a tenure track with a seven year probationary period, rather than the idea of “pre-
sumptive permanence” once a professor was hired. By 1932, approximately half of the universities in 
the United States had adopted formal tenure rules as recommended by the AAUP. RYAN C. AMACHER 
& ROGER E. MEINERS, FACULTY TOWERS: TENURE AND THE STRUCTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 4-7 
(2004). 




33. If committee A finds a university to have terminated a professor in violation of committee A’s 
standards, they will send a prepublication copy of the investigating committee’s report to the university 
administration and give the administration a chance to correct its violation. This is often enough to force 
compliance. For example, at Greenville College in Illinois, a professor was fired on two grounds: 
financial difficulty and weakness in academic performance. In an investigation, committee A found no 
evidence that either ground was justified. After committee A sent Greenville the pre-publication report, 
the administration “promptly” offered the professor a settlement that he accepted as the resolution of his 
case. In addition, the college president started proceedings to change the college’s hearing process to 
effect a dismissal for cause, and said he was “favorably disposed toward adopting the procedures that 
align closely with those set forth in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Ten-
ure.” See David A. Hollinger, Report of Committee A, 2005-06, 92 ACADEME, Sep.–Oct. 2006, at 84, 
85.
34. Lawrence White, Academic Tenure: Its Historical and Legal Meanings in the United States 
and Its Relationship to the Compensation of Medical School Faculty Members, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 51 
(2000) (citing Walter Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in COMMISSION ON 
ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE 93 (1973)).
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geous. Doubtless, this was helped by the predisposition of the colleges’ and 
universities’ presidents and by the belief on the part of the administration 
and trustees of most schools that the grant of tenure would have little cost 
in a setting where dismissals were uncommon in any case.
II. WHAT DOES “TENURE” MEAN?
Among aspiring professors, “tenure” is greatly prized and worthy of 
mighty effort. But exactly what rights does it confer? At a minimum, tenure 
means that a professor cannot be dismissed without proof of just cause in a 
proceeding with elaborate procedural protections for the professor.35
Tenure is commonly defended as a citadel against attacks on academic 
freedom.36 Certainly the cases of Ross, Bemis and others in the early days 
of the twentieth century indicate that protection of academic freedom was 
the principal motivation of its advocates. But tenure is now understood to 
reach well beyond issues of academic freedom. It is also the professor’s 
protection against dismissal for inadequate scholarly output, for weak 
teaching and for other deficiencies in the humdrum daily life of a professor. 
In this paper, I first try to tease some meaning out of the tenure rules and 
then I balance tenure’s virtues against its vices.
At the University of Michigan, where I teach, a professor is informed 
of the grant of tenure by a one-page letter informing him only that he has 
been awarded “tenure.” That single word bears the entire weight of defin-
ing rights that range from the right to criticize the school, to condemn na-
tional political figures, to use profanity in class, or to skip scheduled 
classes altogether. Also included, is the right to due process if tenure is to 
be removed, and, by implication, the statement that tenure can be removed 
upon a showing of proper cause.
Because of the emphasis on procedural requirements in the AAUP 
rules37 and in section 5.09 of the Board of Regents Bylaws at Michigan,38
35. See GENERAL DECLARATION, supra note 20.
36. Id. at 300.
37. The procedural recommendations include several steps: preliminary proceedings (a “personal 
conference” with administrators), communication with the faculty member that begins formal proceed-
ings, a hearing committee review, a hearing, and then consideration by the university’s governing body 
of the hearing’s outcome. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, Statement on Procedural Standards in the 
Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 57 AAUP BULLETIN 206, 207 (1971), in AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 11-12 (1984 ed.).
38. Section 5.09 provides for a similar procedure guaranteed to all tenured professors: notice for 
the faculty member, committee investigation, a hearing if the professor requests it, and review by 
governing bodies. See UNIV. OF MICH. BD. OF REGENTS, BYLAWS OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS § 5.09 
(2012) [hereinafter UNIV. OF MICH. BYLAWS], available at http://www.regents.umich.edu/bylaws/
bylaws05a.html#9.
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“tenure” seems to mean only that one has the right to due process. Howev-
er, that cannot be true. There must be something of substance to be found 
or not found at the end of all that process; otherwise why the process? Re-
member that an at-will employee may be fired for (almost) any reason or 
for none at all.
As demonstrated above, tenure’s seeds are found in cases of infringe-
ment on academic freedom—Ross’s freedom to advocate public utilities, 
Ely and Bemis’s right to defend strikers and Bassett’s defense of black 
people’s rights. These were not professors who were ill prepared for class, 
who treated their students disrespectfully or who failed to produce good 
research, yet the barrier to dismissal protects the marginally competent 
along with the firebrands. If breaches of academic freedom are the rare 
exception but ineffective teaching and writing are common, then the tenure 
contract at best facilitates injuries to our students and, by its protection of 
ineffective teachers and weak researchers, may foster substantial ineffi-
ciencies. Ironically, this procedural keep, built to protect Ross’s rambunc-
tious successors, may have become the home of the indolent.
A. Procedural Protections
A right uniformly bestowed by the grant of tenure is the right to elabo-
rate due process before tenure can be withdrawn. At Michigan, tenure can 
only be withdrawn on an administration proposal to the Regents of the 
University for “dismissal, demotion, or terminal appointment” after a hear-
ing under section 5.09 of the Regents’ Bylaws.39 The “5.09 hearing” can be 
initiated by the provost or by a dean or the executive authority in the pro-
fessor’s school.40
The hearing may take place before the executive committee of the 
school or other “unit” of the University or before an ad hoc faculty commit-
tee in the school or college.41 Sometimes the case is heard by the Senate 
Advisory Committee on University Affairs’ Subcommittee on Tenure 
(SACUA).42 SACUA is made up entirely of faculty members.43 In all cases 
the entire group—judge and jury—is composed of faculty members.44 To 





43. UNIV. OF MICH., RULES OF THE UNIVERSITY SENATE, SENATE ASSEMBLY AND SENATE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON UNIVERSITY § 1 (Nov. 2011 ed. 1997), available at http://www.sacua.
umich.edu/rules/rules-april1997.pdf.
44. UNIV. OF MICH. BYLAWS, supra note 38, at § 5.09.
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thing. The committee members will, of course, see the case through the 
faculty’s eyes; they will be sensitive to intrusion on faculty prerogatives 
and not necessarily be friendly to the university administration’s concern 
about costs, or to student or alumni interests.
Section 5.09 does not state the standard of proof (more likely than not, 
clear and convincing) and does not set out such details as who presents his 
case first. However, the rule does specify many procedural details: (1) the 
charge must be stated with “reasonable particularity,” (2) the professor can 
bring his own counsel, (3) the professor may call and examine any witness-
es that he pleases and may cross-examine the University’s witnesses, (4) 
there must be a transcript and the professor may see all of the documentary 
evidence, (5) the professor is entitled to a review of the hearing commit-
tee’s recommendation, and (6) the recommendation goes to the President of 
the university who is to make a final recommendation to the Regents of the 
university.45 So, at least on paper, the accused tenured faculty member 
cannot be dismissed or demoted unless the university administration has 
convinced two committees, composed exclusively of faculty members, and 
the President and the Board of Regents that the proposed sanction is appro-
priate and within the university rules.46
The AAUP rules state some rights not addressed in section 5.09. The 
rules require that findings be proven by “clear and convincing” evidence, 
and they specifically permit expert testimony from “qualified faculty mem-
bers” if the case charges incompetence.47
B. Substantive Bases for Removing Tenure Status
The references to substantive bases for dismissing a tenured faculty 
member in the Michigan handbook and in the AAUP rules are sparse and 
conclusory. At Michigan, the Faculty Handbook demands “excellent teach-
45. Id.
46. After a case is recommended by a dean or the president or the university, if the faculty mem-
ber requests one, a hearing is conducted either:
(1) before the executive committee of the administrative unit, or (2) before a special ad hoc 
faculty committee appointed by the executive authority with the approval of the executive 
committee or the governing faculty of the administrative unit.” If that committee recommends 
adverse action be taken against the professor, the professor can also request “review of the 
case by the standing subcommittee on tenure appointed by the Senate Advisory Committee on 
University Affairs.
Id.
47. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure, 99 ACADEME, July–Aug. 2013, at 61, 66, available at http://www.aaup.org/
file/RIR2013.pdf.
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ing” for promotion to a tenured position.48 The Handbook contemplates 
termination for cause if the faculty member fails to “maintain a high stand-
ard of teaching.” So it follows that Michigan requires “excellent” perfor-
mance to receive tenure and in theory, at least a decline of below “high 
standard of teaching” to be cast out.49
AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure had elaborate proposals about the proper procedural 
safeguards for the professor up for dismissal, but it did “not think it best . . .
to attempt to enumerate legitimate grounds for dismissal, believing it to be 
preferable that individual institutions should take the initiative at this 
time.”50 By calling for expert professorial testimony in any case involving 
dismissal for incompetence, the 1940 Statement of Principles of the 
AAUP51 acknowledges the possibility of dismissal for “incompetence.” 
However, it has no suggestion about what might constitute incompetence or 
how one would determine that a professor was not competent. By infer-
ence, the AAUP is suggesting that a tenured person’s performance would 
have to decline all the way to “incompetence” to justify dismissal.
The AAUP’s 1975 Statement on Teaching Evaluation is devoted at 
least as fully to the procedural safeguards for the professor being evaluated 
as it is to the means of evaluation. For example, it warns schools that they 
must provide “conditions and support necessary to excellent teaching.”52 It 
also warns that these expectations must be “put in writing” and “periodical-
ly reviewed.”53 It cautions against the “casual procedures” and “unilateral 
judgments” that “too often” characterize the work of deans and chairmen.54
The subtext of the 1975 statement is that evaluation of teaching is an an-
noying inconvenience, which, if it must be done, should be done with the 
greatest concern for the professor, with the lightest possible touch, and, by 
inference, with not much concern for the student consumers of that teach-
ing.
48. UNIV. OF MICH. OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, FACULTY HANDBOOK § 6.B (July 2013) [hereinaf-
ter UNIV. OF MICH. HANDBOOK], available at http://www.provost.umich.edu/faculty/handbook
/index.html.
49. Id. at § 6L.
50. GENERAL DECLARATION, supra note 20, at 301
51. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments, 64 AAUP BULLETIN 108 (1978), in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION 
OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 3 (1984 ed.).
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Even though the AAUP and schools like Michigan decline to identify 
standards by which one might measure the quality of college teaching, 
there are studies and, probably, a fairly wide consensus on what is good or 
at least competent teaching and what is deficient teaching. In their 1999 
book, Faculty Misconduct in Collegiate Teaching,55 Professors Braxton 
and Bayer report on their survey of nearly 1,000 college teachers. The sur-
vey focused mostly on teaching in the first two years of college, but most 
of the findings would be applicable to higher-level teaching, even including 
law school.
The survey asked each respondent to express his or her opinion on 120 
specific acts, believing that the intensity of one’s outrage at bad perfor-
mance is the best measure of incompetence. Most of the statements de-
scribed acts that were thought to show deficient teaching, for example, 
“Class is usually dismissed early” or “The instructor insists that students 
take one particular perspective on course content.”56 In addition, the survey 
included acts that every sensible person would recognize to be out of 
bounds, like “[w]hile able to conduct class, the instructor frequently attends 
class while intoxicated.”57 The respondents marked each behavior as 1 
appropriate/encourage, 2 discretionary, 3 inappropriate/handle informally, 
or 4 very inappropriate/requires intervention.58 The authors’ hypothesis is 
that the degree of moral outrage expressed by the responses to each ques-
tion is a good measure of the behavior’s deviation from what is acceptable:
Faculty members differ in their assessments of a breach of various pro-
scribed behaviors. Norms vary in the intensity: violations of some are 
largely ignored or dismissed as personal eccentricities, whereas viola-
tions of others are seen as demanding the most severe sanction available 
to social agents. . . . Consequently, some norms are inviolable because of 
the extreme severity of the sanctions believed to fit transgressions of 
such norms.59
The survey disclosed seven “inviolable norms” of teacher behavior. 
These were behaviors that drew the highest, and so most critical, scores on 
the 4-point scale: “condescending negativism,” “inattentive planning,” 
“moral turpitude,” “particularistic grading,” “personal disregard,” “un-
communicated course details,” and “uncooperative cynicism.”60
55. See JOHN M. BRAXTON & ALAN E. BAYER, FACULTY MISCONDUCT IN COLLEGIATE 
TEACHING (1999).
56. Id. at 13-15.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 21.
60. See id. at 21-41.
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Six behaviors added up to condescending negativism. The most im-
portant was “the instructor makes condescending remarks to a student in 
class.”61 These behaviors violate the ethics of teaching and constitute, in 
the authors’ view, an abuse of the “asymmetry of power in the class-
room.”62 Nearly three quarters of the faculty respondents ranked the mak-
ing of such remarks as a “4,” calling for formal intervention with the 
teacher.63
The third of the seven inviolables is “moral turpitude.”64 This one is 
relatively easy. It involves a teacher’s sexual relation with a member of the 
class or making “suggestive sexual comments” to a student and it also in-
cludes arriving to class intoxicated.65 I suspect that traditional sex issues 
have involved a male professor and a female student. And I believe that the 
increase of female representation on faculties has reduced this problem 
both because there are fewer male teachers now and because a faculty with 
a large female contingent is less likely to tolerate such behavior. At least at 
Michigan, a proven claim by a female student that her professor made a 
sexual advance will cause a “5.09 hearing” and, if the claim is proven, the 
resignation or retirement of the offending teacher.66
“Personal Disregard” ranges from “offensive body odor” to coming 
late, leaving early and failure to “review the pertinent material for the 
day.”67 These practices are signs of deeper troubles in the professor’s per-
sonality, and these practices are tolerated more often than they should be.68
One of my colleagues of more than forty years ago routinely failed to turn 
in his grades until several months after the examination. In his last years, he 
would sometimes arrive five to ten minutes late to class because he was 
outside smoking. Finally, at the end of one semester he told the Dean that 
61. The others include the instructor expressing impatience with a slow learner in class, an in-
structor criticizing the academic performance of one student in front of other students, an advisee 
treated condescendingly, a faculty member making a negative comment about a colleague in public in 
front of students, and an instructor failing to describe clearly instructions and requirements for course 
assignments to students. Id. at 23.
62. Id. at 22.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 27.
65. Id.
66. UNIV. OF MICH. BYLAWS, supra note 38, § 5.09.
67. BRAXTON & BAYER, supra note 55, at 34.
68. One example of a professor being terminated for poor teaching is quite extreme. A tenured 
Calculus professor at Michigan State University had a mental breakdown in front of a class in 2012. 
Students complained he had been acting eccentrically all semester. His classes were assigned to other 
professors indefinitely after he screamed and stripped naked in front of a class of 31 students. See
Brandon Howell, Michigan State Professor Apologizes to Students for Ranting, Stripping Naked in 
Apparent Breakdown, MLIVE (Oct 8, 2012, 1:35 PM), http://www.mlive.com/lansing-
news/index.ssf/2012/10/michigan_state_professor_apolo.html.
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he could not grade his exams. The Dean roped in two other members to 
read his exams; the next semester the offending professor was retired. A 
cynic might read this to mean that “personal disregard” at the expense of 
students is indefinitely tolerable, but “personal disregard” that inconven-
iences other faculty members, is not tolerable.
The foregoing examples, together with others from Braxton and Bayer 
and other sources, could be shaped to a particular school or college’s needs 
to specify the substantive bases for dismissal or demotion because of inad-
equate teaching performance. To my knowledge, neither Michigan nor any 
other school has written down the kind of behavior in teaching or research 
that would be a basis for demotion or discharge.69 I assume that all schools 
have some fragmentary, hortatory rule about good teaching, but no school 
to my knowledge has anything like the detail that could be constructed 
from Braxton and Bayer’s study.
Stating the acceptable quality and quantity of research is harder than 
defining acceptable teaching. That is so despite the fact that each faculty, 
where research is expected of faculty members, purports to measure every 
tenure candidate’s research attainments and promise, when tenure is grant-
ed.70 Presumably, one could review a colleague’s research and writing by 
simply applying the tenure standard lite—requiring only that the tenured 
member continue to perform at an “acceptable” level that would be some-
what lower in quality and quantity than was initially demanded. Professors 
who produce nothing after they are granted tenure are easy cases. Every 
faculty known to me tolerates one or more such persons. As a witty profes-
sor once said “He gave a wonderful talk when we were considering him, 
but he never opened his mouth again.”
III. THE CONTRACT IN PRACTICE
Since all grants of tenure and almost all dismissals of tenured profes-
sors are private acts by faculties or administrators, it is impossible to collect 
a representative sample of either. One can study the public findings the 
AAUP Committee A issued in the cases where the committee has answered 
the call of the professor who has been dismissed or demoted. But those 
cases are the opposite of a random sample. Those cases are probably the 
unusual ones where the aggrieved faculty member has a claim that his aca-
69. See UNIV. OF MICH. HANDBOOK, supra note 48.
70. Id.
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demic freedom has been tread upon. Beyond the AAUP reports, one has to 
use hearsay and informal reports from those with incomplete knowledge.71
In the forty-eight years that I have been on the faculty at Michigan, the 
law faculty has never held a 5.09 hearing with respect to one of its mem-
bers. The only forced retirement in response to a teaching deficiency that I 
know of is the one described above. On the other hand, Deans have denied 
pay raises to several members who failed to publish. In some of those cases 
the faculty member resigned not long after the Dean’s denial. I know of no 
case in which a faculty member suffered any penalty, much less dismissal, 
because of poor teaching that was not accompanied by inadequate scholar-
ship.
I find only four cases in the Committee A reports since 2000 where 
the proposed demotion or dismissal appears to arise from inadequate per-
formance in teaching or research.72 In all four cases, the administration 
cited either poor teaching or research as the reason for termination, non-
reappointment, or suspension of the faculty member.73 In two of the cases, 
Committee A found that the faculty member’s disagreements with the ad-
ministration were the actual underlying cause for the termination of em-
ployment.74 In one, Committee A considered terminating the professor for 
a violation of academic freedom because she had discretion over how to 
evaluate students in her own classroom.75 In all four, Committee A found 
the university’s process deficient, because they did not hold hearings, or 
71. One informal consideration for both attaining and keeping tenure is collegiality. Being able to 
“work efficiently with colleagues” or demonstrating “good academic citizenship” are qualities endorsed 
by the AAUP as criteria for tenure, and are frequently in universities’ employee handbooks. However, 
its subjective nature can make academia a club closed to women and minorities, and threaten academic 
freedom. See Mark L. Adams, The Quest for Tenure: Job Security and Academic Freedom, 56 CATH.
U. L. REV. 67, 86 (2006) for why using collegiality as a criteria lends itself to this sort of speculation.
72. See David M. Rabban, Report of Committee A, 2007-08, 94 ACADEME, Sep.–Oct. 2008, at 40, 
41 [hereinafter Rabban, 2007-08 Report]; David M. Rabban, Report of Committee A, 2008-09, 95 
ACADEME, Sep.–Oct. 2009, at 43, 45 [hereinafter Rabban, 2008-09 Report]; Joan Wallach Scott, Report 
of Committee A, 2001-02, 88 ACADEME, Sep.–Oct. 2002, at 53, 54 [hereinafter Scott, 2001-02 Report];
Joan Wallach Scott, Report of Committee A, 2003-04, 90 ACADEME, Sep.–Oct. 2004, at 61, 67 [herein-
after Scott, 2003-04 Report]. Of course, a professor who is nominally fired for poor teaching or re-
searching may in actuality be fired because he or she has a disagreement with the administration. The 
fact that the university makes this claim does not mean it is the real reason for the professor’s dismissal.
73. See Rabban, 2007-08 Report, supra note 72, at 41; Rabban, 2008-09 Report, supra note 72, at 
45; Scott, 2001-02 Report, supra note 72, at 54; Scott, 2003-04 Report, supra note 72, at 67.
74. See Mary W. Gray, Warner Lawson, Jr. & Margaret Klayton Mi, Academic Freedom and 
Tenure: Virginia State University, 91 ACADEME, Sep.–Oct. 2005, at 47, 48; Hirschel Kasper, George E. 
Lang & Jean Wilhelm, Academic Freedom and Tenure: Tiffin University (Ohio), 88 ACADEME, Sep.–
Oct. 2002, at 53, 54.
75. Rabban, 2008-09 Report, supra note 72, at 45.
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student evaluations were collected in a manner inconsistent with both the 
AAUP and the university’s own standards.76
My observation of our faculty and my bar stool research on other fac-
ulties tell me that five to ten percent of tenured faculty members would fail 
any reasonable test of their writing or research. By that I mean that five to 
ten percent of most faculties, where research is required for tenure, have 
not produced any significant scholarly work in five years. Since all teachers 
at minimum go to class, we do not have a subset that does no teaching. My 
guess from observing Michigan and several other faculties is that a some-
what smaller number are unacceptable teachers, and, of course, those who 
fail the writing test are not necessarily those who fail the teaching test.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR THE ABOLITION OF TENURE
The reason to abolish tenure is to improve the quality of teaching and 
research by replacing poorly performing professors with others who are 
better teachers and stronger scholars. To understand the magnitude of the 
problem one must have an estimate of the number who fail a fair tenure 
review. Unfortunately there are no reliable public numbers or percentages 
on who would fail such a review. Below, I make an estimate that fits with 
my experience and with the experience of a few others in law schools. 
Once one has an estimate of the numbers, one must compare the expected 
damage that a school will suffer from keeping such underperformers on a 
faculty with the injury that may occur to the school’s reputation and to its 
students.
Let me assume, on modest evidence that a test across all American 
law faculties would show that seven percent fail to do acceptable research 
and that five percent fail to do acceptable teaching. And let me assume that 
about half of the bad teachers are also among the ineffective researchers. 
This means that around ten percent of any faculty could at one time be 
dismissed from the faculty if they served under at-will contracts and re-
ceived a rigorous examination of their work. I also assume that none of 
those in question perform additional compensating work that might make 
up for a failure in teaching or research.
Adopting my assumptions that roughly ten percent of the tenured 
members of every faculty would fail a legitimate examination of their per-
formance in the classroom or in research, and conceding that the tenure 
contract gives protection against arbitrary or vindictive demotion and dis-
76. See Rabban, 2007-08 Report, supra note 72, at 41; Rabban, 2008-09 Report, supra note 72, at 
45; Scott, 2001-02 Report, supra note 72, at 54; Scott, 2003-04 Report, supra note 72, at 67.
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missal, can we justify making all professors into at-will or limited term 
contract employees?
Bad teaching does direct damage to the student. Failure to produce 
competent research, where research is expected of a faculty, does real but 
more remote damage to a school’s reputation and standing. On a law facul-
ty the economic consequence of a member’s underperformance is indis-
tinct. Even with the influence of US News and World Reports rankings, it 
would take many years of shirking by many faculty members before that 
shirking would cause an economic pain from falling enrollment. Well be-
fore falling enrollment, faculty shirking might cause a decline in a school’s
reputation. But that decline itself would have only an uncertain economic 
impact in the form of fewer opportunities for faculty consulting and fewer 
offers of employment from other law schools. On top of that, one might 
expect non-economic injuries to the school in the form of a decline in the 
quality of students and new faculty that the school could attract.
It is easy to say, as I have, that one must compare these faults with the 
presumed virtues, but such a comparison is hard. One must speculate about 
a wide range of variables. In a world with perfect knowledge and precise 
execution the dean will dismiss exactly the right persons, not one more or 
less. This dean will not be deterred by a romantic attachment to the former 
tradition of tenure, nor by a belief that one should never be dismissed who 
has long served, or by the remaining faculty’s anger at the dismissal of a 
beloved colleague. New hires will remain eager to join such a faculty and 
will not shrink from research topics that are long in germination and not 
favored by the dean. Academic freedom will be honored as fully as before, 
and, of course, abolition of tenure will be accompanied by the abolition of 
the attendant due process procedures enabling the newly untenured faculty 
to be dismissed without the need to show cause.
V. ARGUMENTS FOR THE RETENTION OF TENURE
A. Tenure Does Not Protect the Incompetent
Nothing in the AAUP Principles or local rules, including Section 5.09, 
bars a dean from dismissing a faculty member for poor teaching or poor 
scholarship.77 In theory that is true, but in practice it is almost certainly 
false. The due process barriers demanded by the AAUP rules and adopted 
in local rules like Section 5.09 at Michigan are so formidable that any dean 
77. William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary Explanation, and “Defense”, 57 AAUP BULLETIN
328, 331 (1971); UNIV. OF MICH. BYLAWS, supra note 38, at § 5.09.
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who seeks to dismiss a professor for weak research output or inadequate 
teaching would have to devote a major part of his deanship to the case.
Consider the landscape facing the dean who is about to prosecute a 
dismissal. Some cases will have gray margins, not black and white. Should 
we give research credit to one who never writes but who devotes great 
effort and considerable skill to the editing of others’ work? What of the 
teacher who is worshiped by ten percent and despised by ninety? And how 
do we deal with the non-writer who nevertheless assumes additional ad-
ministrative duties in the school?
The hearing itself will be fraught with troubles for the dean. Who does 
the dean call to give proof that goes beyond student evaluations of teaching 
incompetence? Students? Colleagues? Experts from other schools on effec-
tive teaching? And where does one find prominent professors from other 
schools who will to testify about the inadequacy of the defendant’s re-
search?
If dismissal is possible, where are the cases? I found only four cases 
that might be classed as dismissal for inadequate teaching or research in the 
AAUP’s Committee A reports.78 Show me the dean of a law school who 
has formally proposed to withdraw tenure from a professor for weak teach-
ing or inadequate research. I know of none and I doubt they exist.
Conceding that a dean may often urge a professor to retire and may 
even give a nonverbal push by withholding a pay raise, I see no evidence 
that any law school dean is willing to undertake the task of a formal re-
moval of a tenured member who has disregarded a dean’s invitation to 
retire.
B. Abolition of Tenure Will Not Change the Practice
Changing the formal tenure contract might not change the tenure prac-
tice. The dean – and others with administrative authority – may believe that 
the power to fire is illegitimate and at least the dean may fear the angry 
reaction from his faculty over the firing of their good friend or he may wish 
to avoid the messy procedural hearing that might attend a dismissal. The 
dismissal of a senior but untenured member can be expected to excite the 
same unease in other insecure members and feelings of compassion in fel-
low travelers that would occur on the dismissal of a tenured member that is 
discussed above. If that is true, the painful and protracted effort to change 
78. See Jennifer Smith, Reality Catches Up with Storied D.C. Law Firm, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 
2013, 4:05 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873238382045786539823991
52600.html.
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the professors’ contract from tenured to at-will, will have been wasted and 
should not be undertaken.
Are the non-contractual barriers to dismissal of senior faculty that 
high? In many employment settings there is no formal tenure, yet few fir-
ings. Consider partners in large law firms, and in other professional part-
nerships in medicine or accountancy, and think of the many sleepy small 
businesses where the pay is low but the tenure is perpetual. Closer to home, 
think of the many law school professors who do not have tenure. At our 
school there are three kinds of non-tenured teachers, Professors from Prac-
tice, Clinical Teachers, and Legal Practice Teachers. These have three-,
five-, or seven-year contracts, but only two have ever been dismissed, and 
those dismissals may be considered denials of tenure, not dismissals, since 
they were made at the conclusion of a term contract.79
There are some counterbalances to these conservative practices. Prov-
osts or other central administrators might be a force for change of the tradi-
tional practice. In general, a provost who wishes to raise the performance 
and status of the entire faculty of a university and who has no particular 
attachment to any college or to any member of the university faculty can be 
expected to be a tougher judge than a dean who must live with the conse-
quences of any dismissal. So some provosts can be counted on to push a 
hesitant dean.
Declining revenue has caused even large law firms to dismiss partners 
whose positions were thought to be sacrosanct in times of plenty.80 Of 
course, the economic parallel between a law faculty and a group of practic-
ing lawyers or doctors is not perfect. The former earns a salary that is paid 
indirectly by their students; the latter earn their share of the partnership’s 
profits directly by selling legal or medical services to their clients or pa-
tients. If a law or medical partner does less than his fair share there is a 
direct economic impact on the partnership revenue. There is no such direct 
relationship between a professor’s salary and student revenues in most law 
schools, but in the long run, other colleges in a university, will tire of carry-
ing the law faculty.
Yet the economic storms that have forced restructuring of law firms in 
the last decade have now overtaken some law schools and are on the hori-
79. If tenure were abolished but the elaborate dismissal hearing–at which a dean has to prove just 
cause for not renewing a non-tenured person’s contact–is retained, that would be a large impediment 
against change. Anyone serious about abolishing tenure should also insist on the right to dismiss for any 
reason or for none. This surely is a place where the substantive rules are stuffed in the interstices of 
procedure. 
80. See Smith, supra note 78.
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zon for all law schools.81 The trend in law school enrollment portends an 
economic tornado that-will surely damage the current law school model of 
large enrollment, big classes and high pay.82
Between 2003 and 2013, the number of fall applicants to law schools 
declined from just under 100,000 to just over 58,000.83 If one assumes that 
the average tuition is $30,000, those numbers represent a decline in law 
school revenues of $1.2 billion, or a nationwide tuition decline of roughly 
40%. The enrollment decline is driven by the accurate student perception 
that there are not 58,000 new law positions each year.84 It is magnified by 
the fact that law school tuitions have risen by more than the rate of inflation 
for each of the years between 2003 and 2013 and by the amount of debt 
that undergraduates bring into law school.85 According to a recent Wall 
Street Journal article, declining enrollments have already caused some 
schools to buy a handful of senior professors into early retirement, to warn 
non-tenured faculty about the possibility of dismissal, and to cut adminis-
trative staff.86 If the decline in applications that law schools have suffered 
81. See Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, Amid Falling Enrollment Law Schools Are Cutting Facul-
ty, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2013, 4:39 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732
3664204578607810; LSAC Volume Data, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/
docs/default-source/data-(lsac-resources)-docs/lsac-volume-summary.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013).
82. The American Bar Association currently requires law schools to have a high level of tenured 
faculty positions as a condition of accreditation. They are considering softening that requirement in 
order to help schools with their budget crises amid falling enrollment. Kent Syverud, dean of Washing-
ton University School of Law in St. Louis, told the ABA’s task force on the future of legal education, 
“Law professors and law deans are paid too much . . . [e]ither we have to be paid less, or we have to do 
more.” On August 9, 2013, the Council of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar tentatively approved proposed versions of an amendment to the accreditation rules: one requires 
law schools to offer job security to full-time faculty members short of tenure, and the other only re-
quires schools to have policies in place to protect academic freedom. Law School Professors Face Less 
Job Security, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2013, 7:18 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/arti
cles/SB10001424127887323446404579006793207527958. The council then sent out both versions for 
public comment, and they will then be considered by the ABA’s House of Delegates. This is unlikely to 
happen before the ABA’s 2014 annual meeting. Charles Huckabee, ABA Panel Favors Dropping 
Tenure as a Law School Accreditation Standard, THE TICKER (Aug. 12, 2013), http://chronicle.com
/blogs/ticker/aba-panel-favors-dropping-tenure-as-law-school-accreditation-standard/64529.
83. See Jones & Smith, supra note 81.
84. See generally NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, Law School Grads Face the Worst Job 
Market Yet-Less Than Half Find Jobs in Private Practice, NALP.ORG (June 7, 2012),
http://www.nalp.org/ 2011selectedfindingsrelease (last visited July 19, 2013).
85. See Karen Sloan, Tuition is Still Growing, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 20, 2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202567898209&rss=nlj&slreturn=2013061906540
2 (“The number of applicants to U.S. law schools declined drastically during the past two years [2010-
2012], yet the average tuition this fall will climb by more than double the rate of inflation.”); Tuition 
three times faster than inflation, but some schools buck the trend, NAT’L JURIST (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/tuition-three-times-faster-inflation-some-schools-buck-trend
(“Tuition for private law schools grew from an average of $21,790 in 2000 to $37,702 in 2010, an 
increase of 73 percent.”).
86. See Jones & Smith, supra note 81.
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over the last ten years87 persists, it will sweep away the traditional practice 
of lifetime tenure in any place where tenure has been abolished. And if the 
decline in the number of law students continues after 2013, it will sweep 
away not only the practice but also the formal tenure contract and more 
than a few law schools along with it.88
At schools like Michigan, with both tenured and non-tenured long-
term professors, revenue declines will be particularly troublesome. At a 
minimum, the presence of long term untenured faculty who teach clinical 
classes, or the like, will raise issues about any layoff policy that would 
dismiss all untenured faculty before any who are tenured.89 Any school that 
wishes to keep its clinical program manned by untenured practice profes-
sors, may have to dismiss some tenured faculty before all non-tenured clin-
ical faculty are dismissed.
These economic hardships brought on by falling enrollments make it 
unlikely that any school will persist in the practice of lifetime tenure if the 
tenure contract were abandoned. Even in the presence of the tenure con-
tract, it will be a powerful force for change in the contract and in its prac-
tice.
87. Hollinger, supra note 33.
88. Financial trouble can justify termination as well. The AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure allows for tenured faculty termination under “extraordinary circum-
stances” because of a “demonstrably bona fide financial exigency.” See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV.
PROFESSORS, supra note 51, at 112. Since 2000, many more universities used this reason than teaching 
or researching deficiencies to terminate employment of their faculty members. In such cases, committee 
A set a high bar for what constitutes extraordinary circumstances. They asserted termination of em-
ployment of tenured faculty and faculty who were employed for more than seven years must be the last 
resort, colleges must undertake sufficient actions to find alternative methods to improve the financial 
health of relevant colleges, and the faculty must participate in the development of financial reorganiza-
tion plans. In cases where the university was restructuring to alleviate its financial problems, the AAUP 
asserted that universities must try to continue employing faculty made obsolete when courses taught by 
them were still offered or faculty could be trained to teach other courses. The only university committee 
A found to meet this standard in its investigative reports since 2000 was the Louisiana State University 
Health Sciences Center in the year following Hurricane Katrina, which greatly damaged the school. 
Four other schools—Southern University at New Orleans, University of New Orleans, Loyola Universi-
ty New Orleans, and Tulane University—were also damaged and suffered a serious drop in enrollment, 
but the AAUP censured all four for not affording professors due process or trying to find new positions 
for them before terminating them. David M. Rabban, Report of Committee A, 2006-07, 93 ACADEME
Sep.–Oct. 2007, at 64, 66 (2007) [hereinafter Rabban, 2006-07 Report].
89. Tenure has been thought to include an exception for fiscal exigency. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV.
PROFESSORS, supra note 51, at 112. So ironically one might be able to dismiss tenured faculty without 
liability under the cause of fiscal exigency but be found to have breached a 5 or 7 year term contract by 
laying off a person who was nominally inferior to the tenured person but who is found to have no fiscal 
exigency exception in his contract.
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C. Tenure Must Be Preserved to Protect Academic Freedom
Defenders of tenure prefer to march under the banner of academic 
freedom.90 The public press would never acknowledge poor teaching or 
weak research as worthy of its protection, but it can be expected to give 
full-throated defense to academic freedom. Many journalists fancy them-
selves as protectors of the public good, always ready to attack the powerful 
and protect the weak; they are fellow travelers of faculty advocates of aca-
demic freedom.
The early cases at Stanford, Wisconsin, Chicago and Duke that stimu-
lated the adoption of tenure were academic freedom cases. At least the 
public record shows no deficiency in teaching or research by the professors 
that were threatened with dismissal in those cases.91
The context changes, but the problem persists. Some of the earliest ac-
ademic freedom cases involved professors teaching Darwin’s theory of 
evolution in colleges that had religious sponsors.92 Then came disputes of 
the early 20th century about unions, strikes, and the like.93 The middle of 
the 20th century brought Senator McCarthy and the Communist threat.94
But who needs protection today when liberal advocates of the First 
Amendment rule the roost? Perhaps the opponents of affirmative action, or 
the critics of Israel or of Islam, or advocates of the innate inferiority of 
some minority groups? In any case the persistent and recurring nature of 
the problem makes it hard to believe that today’s quiescence will last indef-
initely.
Today there are few academic freedom cases at the prominent public 
and private institutions but the continuing trickle of cases in the Committee 
A reports shows that the issue is still alive. For example, detailing the in-
vestigation at Cedarville University in Ohio, Committee A asserted the 
university’s standards “far exceed the limitations on academic freedom on 
religious grounds Cedarville subscribes to.”95 A professor at Cedarville 
was terminated for disagreeing with a new policy that all professors must 
adhere to a statement on “biblical truth and certainty.”96 He expressed that 
disagreement to students, and criticized the administration for issuing such 
90. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 37
91. See HOFSTADER & METZGER, supra note 1, at 425, 436.
92. Id. at 326.
93. Id. at 425-40.
94. See Merle Rubin, How Academic Freedom Fared Under McCarthyism, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Oct. 16, 1986), http://www.csmonitor.com/1986/1016/dbivor.html.
95. Rabban, 2008-09 Report, supra note 72, at 44.
96. Id.
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a directive.97 At the University of South Florida, a tenured professor of 
computer science was indicted as a member of a Palestinian terrorist organ-
ization.98 He alleged his academic freedom was limited because he was not 
a criminal, just a proponent of Palestine.99 After his arrest, the university 
president dismissed him without a hearing for “abusing his university posi-
tion by using its name and resources in furtherance of improper, non-
educational purposes.”100 The AAUP investigated, but did not censure the 
university, because the president acknowledged that a hearing should pre-
cede any dismissal, and so offered the professor a hearing as part of a post-
dismissal grievance he filed.101
VI. PALLIATIVES
There are at least two things that a school could do to minimize the in-
efficiencies that attend the tenure contract. The first is to substitute an at-
will contract for the tenure contract, but to add a term to that contract to 
prohibit dismissal or demotion for acts that are thought to be protected by 
academic freedom. The second is to adopt a periodic post-tenure review, a 
procedure that is already in use at a number of institutions.102
A. Protecting Academic Freedom by a Term in an At-Will Contract
At-will employment—under which an employee can be dismissed for 
any reason unless the dismissal would violate laws against discrimination 
based on race, gender or ethnic origin—might be a model for a new rule. 
Applying similar thinking to the issue of academic freedom, a professor 
could be dismissed for any reason except that he was espousing an unpopu-
lar cause or otherwise exercising his academic freedom in a way that was 
irksome to his superiors. That rule might find trouble in application if a 
poorly performing professor could make a plausible case that his dismissal 
was really caused by his advocacy of unwelcome ideas. It seems unlikely, 
but not far-fetched, that many facing dismissal for poor teaching or re-
search could mount a plausible claim of infringement on academic free-
dom.103
97. Id.
98. Joan Wallach Scott, Report of Committee A 2002-03, 89 ACADEME, Sep.–Oct. 2003, at 77, 79.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 80.
101. Id.
102. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
103. Some examples: a popular English lecturer at North Idaho College did not have tenure, but the 
administration failed to reappoint her for no specified reason. The AAUP report voiced suspicion she 
was terminated because the administration had a dispute with her husband. Rabban, 2008-09 Report,
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B. Post-Tenure Periodic Review
Post-tenure review has been implemented in 37 states in public 
schools104 and is practiced in hundreds of schools nationwide.105 At a 
number of these schools there is now more than ten years of post-tenure 
review practice; so there are some data on the impact of the process. Alt-
hough some teacher organizations favor post-tenure review,106 AAUP, the 
dominant group in higher education, is opposed107 because “periodic eval-
uation of existing procedures would bring scant benefit and would incur 
unacceptable costs, not only in money and in time but in a dampening of 
creativity and collegial relationships.”108
By asking about the benefit and comparing it to the cost, the AAUP is 
asking the right question, but it is hard to see how properly conducted re-
views would either “dampen creativity” or “threaten academic freedom.” 
Because I write mostly on commercial law subjects and my friend and col-
league, Bill Miller, writes about the Icelandic sagas, must I disapprove of 
supra note 72, at 45. At Our Lady of Holy Cross College in Louisiana, a professor was instrumental in 
convincing the finance committee to adopt a revised salary schedule that the president ultimately did 
not adopt. The professor circulated arguments against the president’s position that were increasingly 
hostile. The president ultimately terminated him, and said he would be paid until the end of his annual 
contract. All professors had one-year contracts renewable at the administration’s discretion. The profes-
sor was not given a hearing or a reason why he was terminated. Rabban, 2006-07 Report, supra note 88,
at 67. Lastly, a professor at University of the Cumberlands in Kentucky created a website that was 
highly critical of the administration and the university ultimately fired him and his department chair. 
Scott, 2003-04 Report, supra note 72. The AAUP censured all three universities for failing to provide 
sufficient due process.
104. CHRISTINE LICATA AND JOSEPH MORREALE, POST-TENURE FACULTY REVIEW AND RENEWAL:
EXPERIENCED VOICES 3 (2002).
105. Currently, there are no national statistics available on the precise number of institutions that 
have post-tenure review policies. Several writers have estimated the percentage to be between 40 and 
70 percent. Peter R. Schuyler, Post-Tenure Review: Policy Effectiveness at Four-Year Private Institu-
tions (June 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Library). One survey of 680 public and private institutions found that 61 percent of 
respondents had a post-tenure review policy in place and another 9 percent had a policy under devel-
opment. Beverly Jo Harris, The Relationship Between and Among Policy Variables, Type of Institution, 
and Perceptions of Academic Administrators with Regard to Post-Tenure Review (1996) (Ph.D. disser-
tation, West Virginia University) (on file with ProQuest Dissertations and Theses). A 2000 Harvard 
study reported that 48 percent of private institutions had post-tenure review. Anne N. Neal, Reviewing 
Post-Tenure Review, 94 ACADEME, Sep.–Oct. 2008, at 27, 28.
106. Christine M. Licata, Post-Tenure Faculty Evaluation: Threat or Opportunity?, 1 HIGHER 
EDUC. REP. 16 (1986), microformed on ERIC No. 270009 (Clearinghouse on Higher Education). How-
ever, these organizations oppose post-tenure review if it can result in the dismissal of tenured profes-
sors. Id.
107. Instead, the AAUP advocates using post-tenure review for faculty development. The AAUP’s 
softening stance on post-tenure review shows how the trend is strengthening. Adams, supra note 71, at 
95 (citing AM. ASS’N. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POST-TENURE REVIEW: AN AAUP RESPONSE (1999),
reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 50, 50-52 (9th ed. 2001)).
108. Jordan Kurland, On Periodic Evaluation of Tenured Faculty, 69 ACADEME, Nov.–Dec. 1983, 
at 4a, 4a.
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his work? I do not think so. In a haste to protect professors from even be-
nign intrusion, the AAUP complains too much. It takes too narrow a view 
of faculties’ capacious taste for all things relating to law from A to Z.
Nor do the data show the value of these reviews to be “scant.” As seen 
from the reviews from the Arizona state university system, the University 
of Massachusetts system, and the Virginia state university system, the post-
tenure reviews appear to be causing professors to shape up, move into re-
tirement, or move out of the professoriate.109 In Arizona, between 2000 and 
2001, 2,711 faculty members were evaluated.110 Nine were found unsatis-
factory in teaching, six unsatisfactory in service, and seventeen unsatisfac-
tory in research.111 Thirteen were assigned to participate in a Faculty 
Development Plan, and nine were directed to begin a Performance Im-
provement Plan.112
At the University of Massachusetts, before the tenure review process 
began, 18% of tenured faculty overall signaled their intention to retire with-
in three years and thus had the process waived.113 Two who rescinded their 
intention to retire were immediately placed in the schedule for review; 173
tenured faculty members completed the process.114 Of those, sixteen were 
assigned a development plan in research/scholarship/creative activity, 
teaching/advising, academic outreach/public service or university ser-
vice.115 Eighty requested professional development funds, and 94% of 
those requests received funds.116
At Virginia, of 400 faculty members who were identified by annual 
evaluations to need a review process, 286 had no needs or problems identi-
fied.117 Fifty-two did not complete the review process because they were 
terminated.118 Twenty-six met all expectations for improvement.119 Thirty-
five did not meet expectations, and of those, twenty-one retired, three had 
mandatory teacher training, two had changed assignments, three had a sala-
ry reduction, and two were terminated.120
109. Sara A. Hook, Post-Tenure Review Then and Now: Retrospective and Prospective Study of Its 
Impact on Faculty and Higher Education, IUPUI SCHOLARWORKS 9, 16 (Oct. 7, 2007), available at 
https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/3018.
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 10.
114. Id. at 9-10.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 10.
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At several other universities, the post-tenure review process similarly 
had a significant impact on the faculty.121 This information is summarized 
in a table below. The effect is hardly “scant.”






Dismissed Other Time Frame
Kansas State 
University
* 19 4 4 1 2000-2001
Univ. of Wiscon-
sin-Green Bay












* 31 18% retired 
before 
evaluation





Univ. of North 
Carolina












* No data available due to inconsistent reporting formats.
In fact, student data on teaching effectiveness is already available at 
most schools, and it will hardly be a secret if a professor has not published 
anything for eight years. Presumably, these reviews need not and do not 
undertake the kind of painstaking evaluation of the quality of the work that 
would be done at tenure time.
However, post-tenure review is not free of all problems. What about a 
professor that thinks and works for several years and then produces a work 
of which the entire faculty is envious? Somehow that person must be ac-
commodated. I suspect that the free pass for a widely respected but unpro-
ductive member might be the more serious problem. Presumably that risk 
121. See id. (describing the impact of post-tenure review on Kansas State University, University of 
Wisconsin-Green Bay, University of North Carolina, and the Colorado state university system).
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will be minimized by the need to treat all faculty members in the same way. 
If some shirkers are called out, then it will be hard to ignore others.
In my view we should not give up on post-tenure reviews. Although 
the data are sparse, it does give hope that these reviews will smoke out 
shirkers and stimulate them to change their ways, retire, or find new work.
CONCLUSION
I believe it is time to change. It is beyond doubt that tenure injures our 
students, blocks the way to eager and highly competent professors, and 
generally degrades the efficiency of our schools. We could abolish tenure 
and test the water to see if something new is needed to protect academic 
freedom. Alternatively, we could adopt the “at-will unless” rule described 
above, or encourage post-tenure review to spread. Every school does not 
need to adopt the same reform; on the contrary, competition and compari-
son among the alternatives might inform us about the defects and virtues of 
each.
